Section B: Information Matching

Directions: In this section, you are going to read a passage with ten statements attached to it. Each statement contains information given in one of the paragraphs. Identify the paragraph from which the information is derived. You may choose a paragraph more than once. Each paragraph is marked with a letter. Answer the questions by marking the corresponding letter on your Answer Sheet.

Why Do Americans Work So Much?

[A] How will we all keep busy when we only have to work 15 hours a week? That was the question that worried the British economist John Maynard Keynes when he wrote his short essay “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” in 1930. Over the next century, he predicted, the economy would become so productive that people would barely need to work at all. For a while, it looked like Keynes was right. In 1930 the average working week was 47 hours in the United States. But by 1970, the number of hours Americans worked on average had fallen to slightly less than 39.

[B] But then something changed. Instead of continuing to decline, the duration of the working week remained stable. It has stayed at just below 40 hours for nearly five decades. So what happened? Why are people working just as much today as in 1970?

[C] There would be no mystery in this if Keynes had been wrong about the power of technology to increase the economy's productivity, which he thought would lead to a standard of living “between four and eight times as high as it is today.” But Keynes got that right: Technology has made the economy massively more productive. According to Benjamin M. Friedman, an economist at Harvard, the U.S. economy is right on track to reach Keynes's eightfold multiple by 2029. That is a century after the last data Keynes would have had access to.

[D] In a new paper, Friedman tries to figure out why that increased productivity has not translated into increased leisure time. Perhaps people just never feel materially satisfied, always wanting more money to buy the next new thing. This is a theory that appeals to many economists. “This argument is, at best, far from sufficient,” he writes. If that were the case, why did the duration of the working week decline in the first place?

[E] Another theory Friedman considers is that, in an era of ever fewer settings that provide effective opportunities for personal connections and relationships, people may place more value on the socializing that happens at work. There is support for this theory. Many people today consider colleagues as friends. But Friedman argues that the evidence for this theory is far from conclusive. Many workers report that they would like to spend more time with family, rather than at work. Furthermore, this theory cannot explain the change in trend in the U.S. working week in the 1970s.

[F] A third possibility proves more convincing for Friedman. That is, American inequality means that the gains of increasing productivity are not widely shared by everyone. In other words, most Americans are too poor to work less. Unlike the other two explanations Friedman considers, this one fits chronologically. Inequality declined in America during the period following World War II, along with the duration of the working week. But since the early 1970s it has risen dramatically.

[G] Keynes's prediction of a shorter working week rests on the idea that the standard of living would continue rising for everyone. But Friedman says that this is not what has happened. Although Keynes's eight-fold figure holds up for the economy as a whole, it is not at all the case for the median American worker. For them, output by 2029 is likely to be around 3.5 times what it was when Keynes was writing. This is a bit below his four-to eight-fold predicted range.

[H] This can be seen in the median workers income over this time period complete with a shift in 1973 that fits in precisely with when the working week stopped shrinking. According to Friedman, between 1947 and 1973, the average hourly wage for normal workers (those who were not in management roles) in private industries other than agriculture nearly doubled in terms of what their money could buy. But by 2013 the average hourly wage for ordinary workers had fallen 5 percent from the 1973 level in terms of actual purchasing power. Thus, though American incomes may have gone up since 1973, the amount that American workers can actually buy with their money has gone down. For most Americans, then, the magic of increasing productivity stopped working around 1973. Thus, they had to keep working just as much in order to maintain their standard of living.

[I] What Keynes predicted was a very optimistic version of what economists call technological unemployment. This is the idea that less labor will be necessary because machines can do so much. In Keynes's vision, the resulting unemployment would be distributed more or less evenly across society in the form of increased leisure. But Friedman says that, for Americans, reality is much darker. Americans now have a labor market in which millions of people — those with fewer skills and less education — are seeking whatever poorly paid work they can get. This is confirmed by a recent poll that found that, for half of hourly workers, their top concern is not that they work too much but that they work too little. This is most likely not because they like their jobs so much. Rather, we can assume it is because they need the money.

[J] This explanation leaves an important question. If the very rich — the workers who have reaped above-average gains from the increased productivity since Keynes's time — can afford to work less, why do they continue to work so much? (Indeed, research has shown that the highest earners in America tend to work the most.) Friedman believes that for many top earners, work is a labor of love. They are doing work they care about and are interested in, and doing more of it is not necessarily a burden. For them, it may even be a pleasure. These top earners derive meaning from their jobs and work is an important part of how they think of themselves. And, of course, they are compensated for it at a level that makes it worth their while.

[K] Friedman concludes that the prosperity Keynes predicted is here. After all, the economy as a whole has grown even more brilliantly than he expected. But for most Americans, that prosperity is nowhere to be seen. And, as a result, neither are those shorter working weeks.

36. Some people view socializing at the workplace as a chance to develop personal relationships.

37. As ordinary American workers' average hourly pay had decreased despite increasing productivity, they had to work just as many hours as before to keep their living standards.

38. American workers' average weekly working time has not changed for nearly half a century.

39. Friedman believes inequality in the U.S. largely explains why increasing productivity has not resulted in reduced working hours.

40. Many economists assume people's thirst for material things has prevented them from enjoying more leisure time.

41. An economist's prediction about a shorter average working week seemed to be correct for a time in the 20th century.

42. In the U.S. labor market, the primary concern of people with less schooling and fewer skills is to secure any employment even if it is low-paid.

43. Keynes was right in predicting that technology would make the economy much more productive.

44. Many of the highest earners have a keen interest in and love for what they are doing.

45. According to Keynes, there would be a shorter working week with everyone's standard of living continuing to rise.

Answers & Explanations

36. E。解析：题干中 view socializing at the workplace as a chance to develop personal relationships（将在工作场所的社交视为发展个人关系的机会）对应 [E] 段的 consider colleagues as friends（把同事当朋友），以及 place more value on the socializing that happens at work（更看重发生在工作中的社交）。

37. H。解析：题干中 ordinary American workers' average hourly pay had decreased（普通美国工人的平均时薪下降了）对应 [H] 段的 the average hourly wage for ordinary workers had fallen 5 percent（普通工人的平均时薪下降了5%）；keep their living standards（保持他们的生活水平）对应 maintain their standard of living（维持他们的生活标准）。

38. B。解析：题干中 has not changed for nearly half a century（近半个世纪没有改变）对应 [B] 段的 remained stable（保持稳定）以及 It has stayed at just below 40 hours for nearly five decades（近五十年来一直保持在40小时以下，five decades 等于 half a century）。

39. F。解析：题干中 inequality in the U.S. largely explains why...（美国的不平等在很大程度上解释了为什么...）对应 [F] 段的 American inequality means that the gains of increasing productivity are not widely shared by everyone（美国的不平等意味着生产力提高的收益并没有被所有人广泛分享），这是为了解释为什么生产力提高没有导致工作时间减少。

40. D。解析：题干中 people's thirst for material things（人们对物质事物的渴望）对应 [D] 段的 people just never feel materially satisfied, always wanting more money to buy the next new thing（人们在物质上永远不会感到满足，总是想要更多的钱去买下一个新东西），且指出 this is a theory that appeals to many economists（这是一个吸引许多经济学家的理论）。

41. A。解析：题干中 An economist's prediction... seemed to be correct for a time in the 20th century（一位经济学家的预测...在20世纪的某段时间内似乎是正确的）对应 [A] 段的 For a while, it looked like Keynes was right... by 1970, the number of hours... had fallen（曾有一段时间，看起来凯恩斯是对的...到1970年，工作小时数已经下降）。

42. I。解析：题干中 less schooling and fewer skills（较少的学校教育和较少的技能）对应 [I] 段的 those with fewer skills and less education（那些技能较少、受教育较少的人）；secure any employment even if it is low-paid（确保任何就业，即使是低薪的）对应 seeking whatever poorly paid work they can get（寻找他们能找到的任何低薪工作）。

43. C。解析：题干中 Keynes was right in predicting that technology would make the economy much more productive（凯恩斯在预测技术将使经济更具生产力方面是正确的）对应 [C] 段的 But Keynes got that right: Technology has made the economy massively more productive（但凯恩斯在这一点上说对了：技术使经济的生产力大幅提高）。

44. J。解析：题干中 highest earners have a keen interest in and love for what they are doing（最高收入者对他们正在做的事情有浓厚的兴趣和热爱）对应 [J] 段的 for many top earners, work is a labor of love. They are doing work they care about and are interested in（对于许多高收入者来说，工作是出于热爱...以及感兴趣的）。

45. G。解析：题干中 shorter working week with everyone's standard of living continuing to rise（每个人的生活水平都在不断提高的更短的工作周）对应 [G] 段的 Keynes's prediction of a shorter working week rests on the idea that the standard of living would continue rising for everyone（凯恩斯对更短工作周的预测基于这样一个观点：每个人的生活水平都会继续上升）。

全文翻译

[A] 1930年，经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯预测，到世纪之交，社会将变得足够富裕，人们将每周仅工作15小时。近一个世纪后，我们依然在等待。凯恩斯的预测似乎最终是错误的。但仔细阅读他的文章《我们孙辈的经济可能性》会发现他对未来有更有趣、更微妙的看法。凯恩斯没有预测我们实际上会每周工作15小时。他预测我们每周将工作15小时以满足我们的需求。我们需要区分这两个预测。第一个预测是技术乐观主义——如果我们能生产更多，我们将工作更少。第二个预测是关于人类本质——如果我们能工作更少，我们会吗？

[B] 凯恩斯可能预测经济增长会让我们更富有，但他对社会是否会让人们享受所有这些闲暇持更悲观的态度。事实上，他担心当有一小群人积累所有财富时，这一时刻可能永远不会发生。他说，对财富的渴望可能永远不会被满足。有些人满足于"较小的收入"，而不是"似乎让我们中大多数人不安、满足不了的经济欲望"。即使经济学家自己也不确定人们是否会接受更多的闲暇。他写道，富人不愿意将"三小时轮班或每周十五小时工作制"作为替代。

[C] 作为一个专业群体，经济学家一个世纪以来一直困扰着人们会如何利用他们的闲暇时间。事实上，似乎许多经济学家认为，如果社会繁荣起来，我们——或者至少是我们的孩子——会变懒、忘记努力工作。事实上，唯一比工作时间长更让经济学家害怕的事情是今天人们工作得不够长。在1930年文章的一个脚注中，凯恩斯甚至提到了这一点。他写道，我们甚至可能试图让"面包"更昂贵，以便人们被迫工作更长时间来买得起它。他的观点是，人类是复杂的，我们的经济决策不仅仅是关于拥有一个地方的。

[D] 凯恩斯和他的同行者的观点是有道理的。人们不仅仅是为了钱而工作。当然，人们工作是为了有饭吃，有房住，并在某种程度上前进。但许多工作还提供了其他东西，如地位和身份。有些人从他们的工作中获得意义和目标。而大量的人实际上喜欢他们的工作，即使他们也喜欢其他活动（比如与家人共度时间或放松）。在某些方面，凯恩斯没有把我们——或者说我们的孙辈——想象成不需要工作的人。他想象他们不需要工作来满足需求——但他们仍需要工作来满足欲望、保持繁忙，并扩展他们的视野。

[E] 所有这些可能让人感到沮丧，但考虑到这一点。一些经济学家说，凯恩斯的基本观点——每周15小时的工作周不需要大部分生活水平，并且可以通过更平等地分配生产收益来实现——可能在今天一样适用。是的，人们会感觉有压力去工作。也许他们害怕无聊或想要意义。这是我们制度中固有的：除非你富有到不需要工作，否则你必须玩升职游戏，在梯子上往上爬，即使你不需要物质进步。但是，一个更聪明的社会会选择优先考虑不同的东西，然后有意识地围绕这些优先事项进行组织。完美的证据是，已经有一些人实现了每周15小时的工作。

[F] 最近远程工作的兴起本身也是越来越多的人实现新平衡的证据。许多已经被提供这种机会。今天，许多人做着比十年前更多的远程工作，如果凯恩斯能看到有多少人已经在很大程度上在他预测的每周15小时工作制内操作，他可能会发现是非常有趣的。一个世纪后，我们仍然没有每周15小时的工作制。但越来越多的工人发现，当他们从家庭办公室做出贡献时，重新控制自己的日程安排更容易。这个技术允许更多的人进入劳动力市场，这是一个经济机会。对工作、家庭和其他追求之间的平衡的渴望正在改变我们在21世纪的生活方式。这些趋势是凯恩斯所预测的可能性的遗产。

核心搭配与高分句型

【核心搭配与高频短语】

• on track：在正轨上，按计划进行（is right on track to reach Keynes's...）
• translate into：转化为，导致（has not translated into increased leisure time）
• appeal to：吸引，对...有吸引力（a theory that appeals to many economists）
• far from：远非，远不足（far from sufficient / far from conclusive）
• hold up：站得住脚，保持不变（eight-fold figure holds up for the economy）
• in terms of：在...方面，就...而言（in terms of actual purchasing power）
• a labor of love：出于热爱而做的事（work is a labor of love）
• nowhere to be seen：无处可见，找不到（that prosperity is nowhere to be seen）

【亮点句型解析】

• 虚拟语气 (If + 过去完成时... would/could/might + have + 过去分词)：
  "There would be no mystery in this if Keynes had been wrong about the power of technology..."
  （如果凯恩斯对技术的威力看错了的话，这就没什么神秘的了。）这是一个典型的与过去事实相反的虚拟语气句型，表达了“因为凯恩斯没看错，所以这确实是个谜”，逻辑非常严密。
• Not... but... (并非...而是...) 引导的对比结构：
  "...their top concern is not that they work too much but that they work too little."
  （...他们最担心的不是他们工作太多，而是工作太少。）`not... but...` 强烈地对比了底层工人的现实困境与经济学家对“休闲社会”的美好预测，凸显了文章主旨。